ORDER WITH OUTLAWS?
LEE ANNE FENNELL
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In response to Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007).
1

In Property Outlaws, Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal provocatively argue that the violation of property laws can enhance the social
order. Using examples that include the settlement of the American
West, lunch counter sit-ins, and urban squatting, Peñalver and Katyal
maintain that the law’s proper development depends in some meas2
ure on the purposeful crossing of property boundaries. While these
breaches disrupt order in the short run, Peñalver and Katyal suggest
that they ultimately produce a more stable legal regime. As the authors put it, “[T]he apparent stability and order that property law provides owe much to the destabilizing role of the lawbreaker, who occa3
sionally forces shifts of entitlements and laws.” In short, the authors
4
present a case for “order with outlaws.”
Peñalver and Katyal make an extremely important contribution to
legal scholarship by identifying and examining potential benefits embedded in what is usually a much-maligned activity—breaking property laws. Their exploration and synthesis of different lawbreaking
contexts is creative, far ranging, and theoretically rich, and their taxonomy of outlaws adds a great deal of conceptual clarity. Although
5
the normative payoff of the project has yet to be fully articulated, the
article’s analysis underscores a central challenge: because most property violations are damaging, we need some way to distinguish socially
valuable boundary crossings from socially destructive ones. The authors suggest that ex post determinations may be able to perform this
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sorting function, but this move only defers, rather than eliminates,
the need for analytic guidance. Building on what I view as the article’s
most compelling theme—the information-generating function of law7
breaking —I will suggest one way of approaching the question.
I. INFORMATIVE OUTLAWS
The article’s most compelling claim is that lawbreaking can generate useful information. As the authors explain, the information
produced by the breaching of property boundaries can take several
distinct forms. First, at least where sanctions are significant or social
stigma attaches to disobeying the law, lawbreaking transmits informa8
tion about the intensity of the outlaw’s preferences. Where the preferences at issue relate to the valuation of a property entitlement, we
would ordinarily rely on markets to gauge intensities. But a knowing
property violation can add information where a market transaction is
unavailable, if the violation occurs under circumstances that allow us
to draw inferences about the violator’s and the record owner’s relative
valuations. For example, adverse possession, if predicated on a know9
ing trespass, could provide just such a test of relative valuations.
Second, breaking a law that blocks particular entitlement reconfigurations can help to overcome society’s “imaginative deficits” by of10
fering a glimpse of a world featuring those reconfigurations. In this
way, information about the implications of a potential legal change
can be vividly conveyed. Peñalver and Katyal provide the powerful example of lunch counter sit-ins, explaining that some people with segregationist leanings changed their views when confronted with the re11
ality of individuals seeking service at a lunch counter.

6
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Third, a pattern of property violations can serve a diagnostic func12
tion by identifying distributive shortcomings in a legal system. The
outlaw’s actions not only draw attention to the problem, but (return13
ing to the point above) instantiate one possible way of resolving it.
That the outlaw-initiated change in distribution will remain in place in
the absence of legal enforcement or self-help on the part of the record owner may also generate useful information about relative valuations—information that may bear on whether society should ratify the
14
change. Instead of approving the specific violations in question, so15
ciety might respond through other reforms to distributive policy.
The point can be generalized further: widespread disregard of a
property law can be symptomatic of a legal or political defect whose
root cause and most promising cure are far removed from the broken
law in question.
II. LINE-DRAWING
The observation that lawbreaking may have an informational silver lining is an important one, but it is not immediately obvious what
to do with that insight. Certainly, Peñalver and Katyal do not suggest
that violations of property rights are always or even usually beneficial
on net. Yet, identifying the characteristics that distinguish the lawbreaking that we might want to encourage (or not overly discourage)
from the mundane run of socially damaging property violations is no
16
easy task. We need some way to sift from the great mass of potential
violations those that are likely to offer especially high-quality informa17
tion that is unavailable from other sources.
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A. Good Outlaws, Bad Outlaws
One simple dimension along which we might sort outlaws is on
the normative attractiveness of the ends that they are pursuing. Here,
we might initially be tempted to favor Peñalver and Katyal’s
“[e]xpressive outlaws,” who violate the law to send a message, over
“[a]cquisitive” or “intersectional” outlaws, whose violations are motivated (in whole or in part) by a desire to redistribute resources in
18
their own favor. But expressive outlaws can have unsavory agendas
19
too, as the authors recognize. Consider an inversion of the lunch
counter sit-in scenario. Following Joseph Singer’s analysis, we might
view public accommodations laws as having established an easement
of sorts that allows people of all races to access meals at a private
20
landowner’s lunch counter during normal hours of operation.
Viewed in these terms, a racist owner’s refusal of service is no less a
property violation than the original sit-in, and the racist owner no less
an expressive outlaw than the civil rights protestors. Just as expressive
ends can vary in normative valence, so too can acquisitive ends—an
outlaw may act out of simple greed or abject need.
After considering such possibilities, Peñalver and Katyal indicate
that their analysis is meant “to encompass both actors whose ends we
21
share and those whose ends we find reprehensible.” However, they
go on to predict that their prescriptions will “likely . . . have different
impacts on different sorts of property outlaws, based on differences in
the objective circumstances and aims of the outlaws and in the de22
mocratic response to their activities.” This qualification suggests an
implicit reliance on either the political system or public opinion to
provide a normative backstop. Such a reliance seems to be somewhat
in tension with the authors’ view of lawbreaking as a corrective to
23
shortfalls in the majoritarian process.

18
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My point is not to criticize Peñalver and Katyal’s principled refusal
to classify outlaws’ agendas based on perceived normative goodness,
nor their apparent hope that truly bad outlaws will be recognized as
such and treated accordingly. But the existence (indeed, prevalence)
of bad outlaws underscores the fact that altering property protections
is not costless. Accordingly, we should seek some analytic basis for isolating those instances in which the information value of lawbreaking is
high enough to be worth the risks involved.
B. Ownership Blockades
We can gain some traction on the question by observing that
when a property interest is protected by what Calabresi and Melamed
24
term a “property rule,” there are two conceptually distinct ways that
an outlaw might violate the owner’s interests. An outlaw may appropriate the owner’s control over whether a transaction occurs (as the
lunch counter protesters, who were happy to pay the going rate for
their meals, were doing), or she may instead appropriate the value of
the thing taken (as a shoplifter does when she makes off with a scarf
that she could easily have purchased at the cash register). Of course,
many outlaws violate both elements of ownership simultaneously, as
when a housebreaker steals a vase (carrying off the item’s value along
with the owner’s prerogative not to sell the thing at all) or a trespasser
tramples the daisies (depriving the owner of both the exclusion right
and the flowers’ worth). But the distinction remains important, because it helps to isolate a feature that is both central to property rights
and vulnerable to societal revision—the owner’s veto power.
1. Outright Vetoes
There is something special about an owner’s ability to block a
transaction, and hence something noteworthy about lawbreaking that
is narrowly focused on removing a blockade. The ability to veto a
transaction altogether—whether it means keeping someone from
crossing one’s property line or preventing a neighbor from forcibly
purchasing one’s home—is central to our notion of property. But this
right of exclusion also presents the danger that resources will be mo-

24

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (“An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove
the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”).
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nopolized in a way that will render them unavailable to a highervaluing user. Property law already incorporates recognition of this
fact through doctrines such as necessity, adverse possession, and eminent domain. Efforts by outlaws to overcome veto rights in new and
different settings may generate useful information about valuereducing blockades.
2. Prices as Vetoes
Outright refusals to deal are only one way that an owner holding a
property-rule-protected entitlement can block a transaction; prices are
another. Property rule protection differs from liability rule protection
not only in precluding involuntary transfers of the owner’s entitlement, but also in giving the owner control over the price at which any
25
such transfer will occur. Liability rules, in contrast, strip the owner
not only of the ability to resist a transfer in a claimant’s favor, but also
26
of the ability to choose the price. Because a high price can block a
transaction just as surely as an announcement that the entitlement is
“not for sale,” the power to set prices can present concerns similar to
those associated with veto rights. But because subjective valuations are
notoriously difficult to verify, an owner who is not granted control over
price levels, as under a liability rule, may be forced to surrender some
27
increment of value.
The upshot is that it will often be difficult to tell whether a high
price represents a “price blockade” adopted for strategic or spiteful
reasons or, instead, an honest statement of value. This, in turn, makes
outlaw behavior in response to the price signal difficult to classify.
Nonetheless, we can readily distinguish cases in which goods are available at competitive prices but the outlaw simply wants to acquire them
for a lower (or zero) price. Such an outlaw is acting not to change the
way that access to the good is structured or to overcome a strategic
holdout problem, but rather only to alter the distributive outcome. In
the ordinary case, such a violation is unlikely to produce useful infor28
mation.
25

See id.
See id. (explaining that, under a liability rule, the value of the entitlement would
be “determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties themselves”).
27
See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2095 (1997) (describing “undercompensation” as the “signature risk[] of . . . liability rules”).
28
But see infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text (discussing the communicative
power and implications of violations that are the product of dire need).
26
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3. Challenges to Vetoes
As a first cut, then, we might focus our attention on outlaws who
break through a veto asserted by an owner with monopoly power over
a resource. By challenging the owner’s right to control whether a
transaction occurs, such outlaws strike at the heart of what is uniquely
property-like (and hence uniquely valuable and worrisome) about
property—its reservation of veto rights to an owner. This is not to say
that all—or even most—challenges to veto rights are information rich,
much less justified. Property rules hold a privileged place in our sys29
tem of law, and for good reason. But when an owner is able to completely preclude access to a resource for which no good substitutes exist, the law should (and typically does) take notice. Outlaws may help
bring to light unnoticed or underappreciated impediments stemming
from owners’ monopolization of resources.
A focus on blockades also offers a way to distinguish vetochallenging property violations, like lunch counter sit-ins, from violations that assert veto powers in areas where access has been legally
mandated, like the exclusion practiced by the racist luncheonette
owner. This distinction dovetails with arguments about political inertia. As Peñalver and Katyal emphasize, “[P]roperty law is unusually resistant to legal change,” for reasons that likely include the constitutional protections extended to property interests and the vested
30
interests that property-holders have in preserving the status quo.
The fact that property is by its very nature an access-constricting institution might suggest that this inertia typically operates in the direction
of locking in veto rights, rather than locking in access rights. If this is
correct, property violations that challenge veto rights, especially those
of long standing, might be expected to produce more meaningful information than would be generated by violations of access rights more
31
recently established through the political process.
29

See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 27, at 2096-99 (discussing the dominance of property rules over liability rules); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1719, 1724 (2004) (“The preference for property rules can be understood as a
response to the information costs that shape other aspects of entitlement delineation.”).
30
Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 1, at 1133; see id. at 1133-35 (discussing reasons for
property law’s resistance to change).
31
Cf. Daniel Markovits, Essay, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897, 1933-34
(2005) (suggesting that “the distance between [a democratically authoritative sovereign] engagement and the present political situation—measured in terms of citizen
preferences, institutional continuity, time, or whatever other variables contribute to
individual authorship of collective decisions . . . may be so great that the conditions of
sovereign authority no longer apply in connection with the policy at hand”).
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III. RESPONSES TO OUTLAWS
As Peñalver and Katyal recognize, it is not enough to identify the
sorts of violations that have high information content. It is also necessary to consider what adjustments (if any) we might make to property
law to selectively elicit that information. Avoiding an undue weakening of the property system as a whole is an obvious concern, and one
that is reflected throughout the article. Another problem, also recognized by the authors, is that any legal incentive (or reduction in disincentive) for property violations will dilute the informational signal
32
that a violation sends. Although Peñalver and Katyal grapple with
these tensions at some length, approaching the question with the notion of vetoes or blockades explicitly in mind can shed useful light.
My focus on owners’ veto powers and my invocation of the work of
Calabresi and Melamed might seem to suggest that liability rules
would be the best way to harness the information generated by lawbreakers. That is not necessarily the case. Injunctive relief, the standard accompaniment to property rule protection, would indeed have
an information-muffling effect, at least if it were imposed quickly
enough to stop violations from occurring or from coming to the at33
tention of the polity. But liability rules are not the only alternative;
property rules can also be enforced with supercompensatory penalties. Allowing outlaws to obtain stolen entitlements at their fair market value—the liability rule solution—would be expected to underdeter violations and, at the same time, weaken the informational signal
associated with a violation. In many settings, a better answer will be to
keep supercompensatory penalties in place that can meaningfully test
the outlaw’s preference intensity without precluding her message
from being heard.
In some cases, however, the good being sought by the outlaw is of
such an essential character that the presence of a legal blockade and
the absence of any alternatives may be enough to make out a prima
facie case against penalizing the violation. The doctrine of necessity
follows this reasoning, albeit in limited circumstances, and Peñalver
and Katyal’s notion of “expressive necessity” would extend the idea to
32

See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 1, at 1181 (“The trick is to avoid completely
foreclosing certain types of productive lawbreaking without encouraging broader
criminal behavior to such a degree that the informational value of productive lawbreaking is itself destroyed.”).
33
I mean to include here not only injunctive relief as such, but also direct police
action undertaken to prevent a violation from occurring or to stop an ongoing violation.
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34

a subset of expressive lawbreaking. Peñalver and Katyal observe that
“direct civil disobedience”—breaking the very property law that one is
protesting—may at times represent the only feasible way to demon35
strate the implications of an entitlement realignment. Copyright’s
fair use doctrine, which can permit limited borrowing from a work for
36
purposes of parodying it, offers an interesting analogy. Just as some
amount of borrowing from a work is indispensible to a parody of that
37
work, so too may access to property be necessary to critique the entitlement system embedded within it. In both cases, the owner controls
an element essential to a particular message and for which there are
38
no good substitutes.
A somewhat different challenge is presented by an acquisitive outlaw who is in such dire need that his violation communicates a fun39
damental failure of the social structure. As Jeremy Waldron has argued, the state’s withdrawal of all public places for performing
necessary functions (such as sleeping) is logically inconsistent with the
strong protection of private property rights, because these activities
40
must be done somewhere if a person is to exist at all. In this context,
no single owner holds a blocking monopoly on the resource in question (a place to sleep), but all owners are collectively able to foreclose
41
access to that resource to those who lack property of their own.
While the strong enforcement of private property boundaries may be
necessary to avoid placing undue burdens on any particular private
owner, exclusion from public places must hinge on the availability of
some alternative location for performing essential life functions. For

34

See id. at 1183-84.
See id.
36
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (analyzing
parody within copyright’s “fair use” framework); Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair
Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 71-74 (1992) (distinguishing parody that targets the borrowed work itself from parody that borrows from one work to mock something else).
37
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 (“When parody takes aim at a particular original
work, the parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make
the object of its critical wit recognizable.”).
38
See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 1, at 1183-84 (distinguishing “indirect civil disobedience” (breaking one property law to critique another law) from “direct civil disobedience” on the grounds that expressive alternatives are lacking for the latter); Posner, supra note 36, at 71-74 (discussing the market obstruction to obtaining access to a
work for purposes of parodying it, and distinguishing the case in which one work is
used as a parodic weapon against a different work).
39
See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 1, at 1153-55.
40
Jeremy Waldron, Essay, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV.
295, 296-302 (1991).
41
See id.
35
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example, in the wake of a Ninth Circuit opinion employing similar
42
reasoning, the City of Los Angeles has recently agreed not to enforce
bans on sidewalk sleeping, pending the provision of 1250 new beds for
43
low-income persons. Such acts of provisional ratification are likely to
generate important inputs to the political process.
CONCLUSION
Peñalver and Katyal persuasively argue that property violations
can, at times, generate information that is discourse-enhancing, market perfecting, inertia defeating, reform inducing, and, ultimately, order preserving. But most property violations destabilize the social order without producing any significant offsetting benefits. The
authors’ analysis highlights the need for greater analytic clarity about
the kinds of violations—and the kinds of remedies for them—that
tend to generate net informational benefits. In pursuing that objective, it seems fair to observe that much of what pushes our intuitions
about property outlaws has at its heart anxiety about the very potent
veto rights that we extend to owners. Those rights are fundamental to
our vision of ownership, but they have also been hedged about with
exceptions and modifications to prevent owners from unduly blocking
transactions. The work of refining property law to strike the right balance between access and exclusion is always ongoing, and Peñalver
and Katyal skillfully show us that outlaws can offer useful, if unconventional, guidance.
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